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Abstract
Regional value chains (RVCs) and South–South trade are increasingly
considered key features of 21st-century globalisation. This article investigates
how RVCs are shaped by the interaction of private and public governance. It
evaluates how this interaction unfolded in Southern Africa’s apparel RVCs,
exploring trade, investment and labour regimes across three levels of analysis:
national, regional, and global. The paper draws on trade data, secondary
literature, and interviews with suppliers and institutions in Eswatini and Lesotho
(the largest exporters to the region), and lead firms in South Africa (the largest
regional importer). The findings underline the critical role of public governance
in shaping retailers’ and suppliers’ participation in RVCs through: (i) regional
‘trade regimes’ protecting regional exporters from global competitors, and
recent shifts in global trade regimes; (ii) national and regional ‘investment
regimes’ facilitating investment flows from South Africa to Lesotho and
Eswatini, and the more recent shift of US-oriented suppliers towards regional
markets; and (iii) ‘labour regimes’, including lower wages, less comprehensive
labour legislation and weaker trade unions in Lesotho and Eswatini compared
to South Africa. The article concludes by considering the policy implications of
the interaction of private and public governance for existing and future RVCs in
Sub-Saharan Africa.
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INTRODUCTION
Recent studies show that South–South trade now exceeds North–
South trade, and that intra-regional commerce accounts for a large
share of the global South’s improved trade performance (Horner &
Nadvi, 2018). This is leading to a growing interest in the role of
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‘regional value chains’ (RVCs) within the academic
and policy communities (Barrientos et al., 2016;
McKinsey & Co., 2019; Pasquali, 2019). Yet our
understanding of the dynamics behind RVCs
remains limited.
Historically, research on global value chains
(GVCs) has given primacy to the role of lead firms
and the governance of their interactions with
suppliers (Gereffi et al., 2005). This emphasis is
also seen in much of the emerging research on
RVCs (Morris et al., 2016; Staritz & Morris 2017;
Suder et al., 2015; Rugman et al., 2009). Recently,
various scholars from across the GVCs, global
production networks and international business
fields have argued for a better understanding of the
influence of public policy in shaping value chain
dynamics (Coe et al., 2008; Horner & Alford, 2019;
Van Assche, 2017). There is growing evidence, for
example, that industrial, trade and labour policies
have significant impacts on the geographies of
GVCs (Curran et al., 2019; Whitfield et al., 2020).
However, investigating how public and private
governance interact to inform lead firms’ and
suppliers’ strategies in RVCs in the global South
remains limited (Krishnan, 2018; Pickles et al.,
2015). This gap cuts across disciplinary boundaries
of international business and economic geography,
and addressing it is relevant for policy actors at
national, regional and global levels.
In seeking to fill this gap, we first consider how
the interaction of public and private governance at
the national, regional and global levels might shape
firms’ participation in RVCs. On public governance,
we investigate the interaction across three distinct
regimes: ‘trade regimes’ influenced by regional and
global preferential trade agreements; ‘investment
regimes’ under national investment strategies; and
‘labour regimes’ defined by wage differentials,
national labour regulations and the effectiveness
of trade unions. The term ‘regime’ recognises that
the rules and incentives that underlie public gov-
ernance involve a combination of policy regula-
tion, policy implementation and the role of public
and private institutional actors that influence this
process (Smith et al., 2018). Second, we empirically
evaluate this framework through a study of the
apparel RVCs in Southern Africa. The Southern
African apparel industry, including its participation
in GVCs (Gibbon, 2008; Staritz, 2011), and the
implications of emerging RVCs for local suppliers
have been previously studied (Morris & Staritz,
2014; Morris et al., 2011; Staritz & Morris,
2012, 2017). We build on this earlier work, in order
to assess how the interaction between private and
public governance helps explain the ways in which
apparel RVCs have developed in Southern Africa.
Our particular focus is on South Africa as the main
regional importer of apparel, and its nearest
regional neighbours – Lesotho and Eswatini as the
largest apparel exporters to the region.
We note two critical features of apparel RVCs in
Southern Africa. First, the dominance of South
Africa as the regional end market for apparel.
Second, the power and influence of South African
retailers, in particular six lead firms, which together
account for 90% of the South Africa apparel market
and have an increasing retail presence across the
subcontinent. In this context, public governance,
involving the interaction between trade regimes,
investment regimes and labour regimes, played a
critical role in shaping both retailers’ sourcing
decisions and suppliers’ participation in South
African-led RVCs. This came about through: (i)
duty- and quota-free trade under the Southern
African Customs Union (SACU) and Southern
African Development Community (SADC) rules of
origin, and the recent exclusion of Eswatini from
the United States’ (US) African Growth and Oppor-
tunity Act (AGOA); (ii) attractive national invest-
ment policies in Eswatini and Lesotho, which
favoured the inflow of South African investments
and (in Eswatini) the shift of US-oriented suppliers
towards regional markets; and (iii) more compre-
hensive labour legislation and a stronger trade
union presence in South Africa, resulting in signif-
icantly higher minimum wages compared to Eswa-
tini and Lesotho.
Our paper makes two important contributions.
First, existing scholarship on the dynamics of value
chains in both the economic geography and inter-
national business disciplines has tended to focus on
the private governance of North–South networks
(Mayer & Phillips, 2017; Alford & Phillips, 2018).
Although the role of states and civil society in
GVCs has been increasingly acknowledged (Alford
et al., 2017; Langford, 2019), we push this cross-
disciplinary literature forward by conceptualising
not only the dynamic interaction of public and
private governance across different geographical
levels of analysis, i.e. national, regional, and global,
but also the significance of understanding the
interaction between trade, investment and labour
regimes in explaining how RVCs evolve over time.
Second, from an empirical perspective, previous
research on apparel RVCs in Southern Africa mostly
focused on aspects of trade, lead firm’s sourcing
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strategies, ownership and social embeddedness,
and suppliers’ upgrading (Staritz 2011; Morris
et al., 2011, 2016; Morris & Staritz, 2012; 2014;
2017). To the extent that public governance was
included, it was largely limited to considerations of
trade agreements and rules of origin within intra-
SADC and SACU trade (Staritz 2011; Morris &
Staritz 2017). Comparatively lower labour costs
were also indicated as a determinant of South
African investments in Lesotho’s apparel (Godfrey
2015; Morris & Staritz, 2017). In this article, we
build on this literature to argue that understanding
the dynamics of apparel RVCs in Southern Africa
requires unpacking the interactions between pri-
vate and public governance. This includes analys-
ing trade, investment, and labour regimes, which
are shaped by global, regional and national policies,
as well as examining how these policy regimes are
critically interwoven.
Methodologically, we draw on an extensive
reading of the literature, analysis of country-level
trade data from UN-COMTRADE, primary research
over a number of years in Lesotho, and primary
fieldwork undertaken in 2019/20 in Eswatini and
South Africa. Interviews were conducted with five
of the six major South African retailers as well as
with a range of South African key informants. The
interviews in Lesotho and Eswatini included four
with government officials, three with trade unions
and employers’ associations, and 31 manufacturers
(21 in Eswatini and ten in Lesotho). The focus on
South Africa, Eswatini and Lesotho for our primary
data is warranted by their respective positions as
the largest buying and manufacturing countries in
the regional apparel value chain.
The article is structured as follows: section two
presents the study’s analytical framework; section
three describes the growth of apparel GVCs and
RVCs in Sub-Saharan Africa; section four investi-
gates the role of private governance in explaining
the dynamics of RVCs linkages; section five
explores the role of public governance, focusing
on trade, investment and labour regimes; section
six concludes and considers the policy implications
of our findings.
CONCEPTUALISING REGIONAL VALUE CHAINS
RVCs connect lead firms and suppliers within a
single world region, defined by ‘common regula-
tory regimes (such as the European Union), prefer-
ential trading rules for their regional members (like
ASEAN), or have a notional regional identity (like
Latin America)’ (Horner & Nadvi, 2018, 222). The
determinants of links between lead firms and
suppliers in RVCs in the global South are poorly
understood (Horner & Nadvi, 2018; Krishnan,
2018; Morris et al., 2016). This is in spite of recent
data pointing to a ‘regionalisation trend’ in GVCs
(McKinsey & Co., 2019). Below we summarise key
arguments on the evolution and governance of
RVCs. These are grouped into two categories: (i)
private governance, where lead firms are the main
orchestrator of RVCs; and (ii) public governance,
where state policy and interventions by public
authorities influence the formation and organisa-
tion of RVCs.
Private Governance
To understand the role of private firms in estab-
lishing and governing their interactions across
RVCs, we distil three sets of arguments.
First is what we call RVCs as spillovers from GVCs.
Barrientos et al. (2016a) and Krishnan (2018) have
associated the growth of regional horticultural
value chains in Eastern and Southern Africa with
a process of ‘strategic diversification’ from global
towards regional production networks. In some
cases, lead firms in RVCs have also replicated the
governance structure of GVCs – i.e. ‘learning by
imitation’ – including the use of suppliers’ exclu-
sivity contracts and private standards (Das Nair
et al., 2018; Reardon et al., 2007, 251). Concerning
the apparel sector in Southern Africa, Morris et al.
(2016) argued that a number of suppliers previously
exporting overseas successfully shifted to serving
the regional South African market. Yet, they main-
tain that RVCs remained separate from GVCs, with
the former characterized by comparatively smaller
batches with a higher fashion content, and speed-
to-market production (Morris et al., 2016; Staritz &
Morris, 2017).
Second, RVCs benefiting from firm- and country-
specific advantages. Studying the determinants of
RVCs in East Asia, Suder et al. (2015) conclude that
the proximity of countries at different stages of
economic development, featuring different labour
costs and capabilities, is likely to facilitate intra-
regional production networks between lead firms in
more advanced economies and suppliers in com-
paratively lower income countries. In relation to
Japan first and China later, this dynamic has been
observed to produce advantages for lead firms as
they benefit from lower labour costs, and for
suppliers in less-developed countries as they inte-
grate into their neighbours’ production networks,
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generating revenue and employment (Suder et al.,
2015). This pattern reflects the renowned Asian
flying geese paradigm, whereby production continu-
ously shifts from more to the less advanced nations
in response to changes in national comparative
advantages (Kojima, 2000). In the context of the
regional apparel value chain in Southern Africa,
Staritz (2011, 85) also argued that territorial prox-
imity and lower labour costs in Lesotho and
Eswatini played a role in motivating South African
manufacturers to relocate production to these
neighbouring countries.
Third, RVCs arising from the embeddedness of
domestic and regional investors (Morris et al., 2016;
Staritz & Morris, 2012). Relative to the apparel
sector in Sub-Saharan Africa (SSA), Morris et al.
(2016) show that variations in firms’ ownership are
critical to explain participation and upgrading
across global and RVCs: ‘Ownership characteristics
of supplier firms shape the ability to shift between
different end markets and respond to lead firm
requirements’ (Morris et al., 2016, 1244). According
to these scholars, the evolution of apparel RVCs in
Southern Africa was enabled by local (in Mauritius)
and regional (in Lesotho and Eswatini) investors. In
addition, East Asian-owned firms located in South-
ern Africa supplied buyers in the global North. For
such transnational firms, ties with buyers and
strategic decisions were finalised at their East Asian
headquarters and not by the Southern African
manufacturing plant. In Lesotho and Eswatini, for
instance, transnational firms exporting almost
entirely to the US were mostly owned by Taiwanese
investors, while regional exporting firms were
owned by South African and the few Asian
investors who had developed ‘stronger ties to South
African buyers [did so] based on proximity and
ability to meet smaller order sizes’ (Morris et al.,
2016, 1255). Similarly, in Madagascar, geographical
proximity and cultural ties with Mauritius played a
crucial role in the formation of regional production
networks connecting Mauritian apparel producers
to Malagasy suppliers (Morris & Staritz, 2014;
Morris et al., 2016).
These three arguments are not mutually exclu-
sive but highlight different approaches to explain-
ing private determinants of RVCs. In our view, a
focus on private governance is insufficient to
understand the evolution of apparel RVCs in
Southern Africa. We also need to grasp how public
governance influences firms’ behaviour.
Public Governance
The broad scholarship on value chains is under-
pinned by ‘persistent firm-centrism’ (Alford &
Phillips, 2018). Consequently, the term governance
has historically ‘retained a strongly firm-centric
character’, with lead firms exercising governance
over suppliers through varying levels of power
(Mayer & Phillips, 2017, 135). The international
business literature also overwhelmingly focuses on
the private governance of inter-firm networks and
knowledge flows between buyers and suppliers
(Buckley & Strange, 2015; Kano et al., 2020). More
recently, scholars across both traditions have begun
to explore the role of public governance in shaping
labour conditions and innovation in GVCs (Locke,
2013; Van Assche, 2017). For instance, in the
context of GVCs, scholars have explored the role
of states and civil society organisations in deter-
mining product and labour standards among sup-
pliers in the global South (Alford et al., 2017;
Langford, 2019; Horner & Alford, 2019). Yet,
empirical literature analysing the interaction
between private and public governance of RVCs
remains ‘surprisingly very limited’ (Slany, 2019,
327). In the following paragraphs, we summarise
arguments that relate to the role of investment,
trade, and labour regimes in shaping trade in RVCs
and GVCs.
First, state regulations can be used to enable
domestic firms to link rapidly, efficiently and
reliably with foreign value chain partners (Van
Assche, 2017). In particular, investment regimes are
critical to attract foreign investors, facilitating
learning and ‘filling the gap’ in countries’ exporting
sectors (Blyde et al., 2014). State-developed export
processing zones (EPZs) with preferential taxation
and rebates on fabric imports have crucially con-
tributed to attracting apparel foreign direct invest-
ments (FDIs) in Mauritius, Madagascar, Ethiopia
and Kenya (Farole, 2011; Morris & Staritz, 2014).
Previous research on Asian FDIs in Lesotho’s
apparel industry has also highlighted the impor-
tance of financial incentives to attract overseas’
investors (Bennet, 2006).
Second, regional and global trade regimes can
significantly influence lead firms’ geographies of
sourcing (Curran et al., 2019). Using intra-regional
trade in value-added as an indicator of participation
in RVCs, Slany (2019) finds that trade liberalization
with a reduction of import tariffs on capital goods
favoured countries’ participation in RVCs across
SSA. In the apparel sector, multilateral trade
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agreements granting preferential access to the EU
and the US markets have been crucial in developing
apparel GVCs across Africa, Asia, and South Amer-
ica (Bair, 2017; Pickles et. al., 2015; Kaplinsky &
Morris, 2008). In SSA, duty-free trade under the
SADC Trade Protocol and SACU facilitated intra-
regional apparel trade (Staritz, 2011, 85–87). Con-
versely, recent research by Chang and Lohre (2016)
in Ethiopia and Rwanda shows how protectionist
trade policies introduced by national governments
can screen local manufacturers from global compe-
tition, effectively enabling firms’ participation in
global export markets. Similarly, according to Star-
itz and Whitfield (2017, 3; Whitfield et al., 2020),
what sets Ethiopia’s apparel sector apart is the
parallel presence of a protected national mar-
ket along with liberalised global exports ‘as firms
make profits in the protected domestic market
while they are learning how to meet the cost,
quality and delivery standards of export market.’
Third, comparative labour regimes matter.
National labour legislation falls within the realm
of public governance. Such legislation can set
minimum wages and standards as well as regulate
health and safety, but it also enables organisation
and collective bargaining by trade unions. Labour
rights and agency in GVCs have been a growing
focus of research. However, scholars have adopted
different approaches to labour, ranging from the
issue of labour control regimes (Smith et al., 2018)
and the labour process (Taylor et al., 2013), to
worker agency and resistance (Coe & Jordhus-Lier,
2011; Selwyn, 2012), to labour standards linked to
social upgrading (Barrientos et al., 2011). Moreover,
and intersecting with aspects of private gover-
nance, the creation and enforcement of labour
codes by NGOs such as Clean Clothes Campaign as
well as multi-stakeholder initiatives, such as the
Ethical Trading Initiative or the International
Labour Organisation’s (ILO) Better Work Pro-
gramme, bring together government, trade unions,
suppliers and buyers (Bair, 2017). To our knowl-
edge, however, few studies have had a regional
focus with respect to labour regimes in the global
South (Godfrey, 2015); and none have considered
their interaction with other aspects of public and
private governance in RVCs.
Private and Public: A Dynamic Interaction
Approach
As they outsource production tasks, lead firms face
a variety of risks connected to product quality,
management, labour, and the environment.
According to the economic geography and inter-
national business literatures their responses to
these pressures varies depending on context-speci-
fic economic, political, social, and geographical
factors (Yeung & Coe, 2014; Kano et al., 2020).
Scholars have used concepts such as ‘multi-scalar’,
‘hybrid’, and ‘synergistic’ governance to indicate
how suppliers’ participation in GVCs is inevitably














Figure 1 Exports to SSA by top SSA exporting countries (trend) – thousand USD. Notes: South Africa is omitted since 96.4% of its
exports is constituted by re-exports (Barnes and Hartogh, 2019). Source UN-COMTRADE.
Regional value chains in Southern Africa Giovanni Pasquali et al.
372
Journal of International Business Policy
civil society initiatives, and public policies (Alford
et al., 2017; Bair, 2017; Gereffi & Lee, 2016). In this
domain, Pietrobelli and Staritz (2018, 570) advocate
a ‘multi-scalar framework that goes beyond tradi-
tional approaches that either focus on the nation
state or the firm’. A key contribution, they argue, is
to unravel the interactions between private and
public actors while ‘integrating the global with the
local, and the firm (micro) with the meso and
macro levels.’
We support such an integrative endeavour and
draw on Gereffi and Lee’s (2016) taxonomy for
‘synergistic’ governance, which we adapt by replac-
ing their categories of horizontal and vertical gover-
nance with multi-scalar geographical dimensions.
Our adaptation accounts for an increasing overlap
between GVCs and RVCs in a context of shifting
end markets (Horner & Nadvi, 2018), requiring
consideration of private and public governance
interactions at the national, regional and global
levels. While Gereffi & Lee’s (2016) concept is
specific to the relationship of clusters with GVCs
and models six potential upgrading trajectories, our
adaptation is used primarily to organise and anal-
yse empirical data with the focus on RVCs. Notably,
Gereffi & Lee (2016) use ‘social governance’ to
indicate the action of civil society organisations
(including NGOs and trade unions). However, trade
unions are generally established and act within
frameworks prescribed in countries’ labour legisla-
tion, which effectively blurs the distinction
between public and social governance. Hence, our
preference for the use of the term ‘labour regimes’
as this more accurately captures how rules in
respect of labour are framed and implemented,
and the impact that labour organisations and trade
unions play in shaping the resulting practices
(Smith et. al., 2018).
In sum, we recognise that lead firms exercise
private governance to coordinate value chain link-
ages, including compliance by suppliers with codes
of conduct. At the same time, we note that public
governance, through national laws and inter-gov-
ernmental bilateral, regional and global regulations
and trade agreements influences these dynamics,
and we explore how public policies shape trade,
investment and labour regimes. Hence, we address
three major concerns related to economic geogra-
phy and international business research: the firm-
centric approach that leaves public institutions
‘lurking in the background’ (Locke, 2013; Alford
& Phillips, 2018, p. 99); the limited attention to
labour regimes and regulations in shaping RVCs in
the global South (Godfrey, 2015; Barrientos et al.,
2016); and the overwhelming focus on North-
South GVCs, overlooking local and regional actors
in the global South (Buckley & Strange, 2015, 246;
Horner & Nadvi, 2018).
APPAREL RVCS IN SUB-SAHARAN AFRICA:
A SOUTH AFRICAN STORY
Sub-Saharan Africa (SSA) is one of the least trade
integrated regions worldwide. Whilst in Asia,
Europe, and America intra-regional trade accounts
for respectively 61.1%, 67% and 47.4% of these
regions’ total trade share, in Africa this figure drops
to 15.2% (UNCTAD, 2019). Nevertheless, the
apparel sector represents a notable exception. Since
2005, intra-SSA trade in apparel has grown more
than fourfold to account for about 34% of the
region’s total apparel exports. Comparatively,
exports to the developed North have decreased by
30% over the same period, shifting from 92% to
66% of the sector’s export share (UN-COMTRADE).
Excluding Ethiopia (Staritz & Whitfield, 2017),
today’s SSA apparel exporters emerged in the 1990s
and early 2000s, initially as a result of quota-
hopping FDIs arising from the Multi-Fibre Arrange-
ment, and subsequently benefitting from duty-free
access to the United States (US) and European
Union (EU) markets under the US’ AGOA and EU’s
Everything-But-Arms trade regimes (Gibbon, 2008;
Staritz, 2011). Whilst the dynamics of the sector’s
emergence vary across different countries, Lesotho
and Eswatini both benefitted from an early inflow
of Taiwanese FDIs organised through triangular
networks linking head offices in Taiwan, where
orders are processed, to retailers in the US and
production units in Southern Africa. As argued by a
number of studies that address this period in more
detail, these were essentially ‘footloose’ invest-
ments with very limited local and regional linkages
(Staritz, 2011; Staritz and Morris, 2017).
Some two decades later, although the global
North remains an important market for most of
these countries, a significant regionalisation trend
has emerged (Staritz & Morris, 2012). In line with
previous findings (Morris et al., 2016), export data
indicates a growth in regional exports for Eswatini,
Lesotho, Mauritius, and Madagascar (Fig. 1). More-
over, each of these four countries experienced a
diversification of end markets from the North to
the region (Fig. 2). Between 2010 and 2018, Mau-
ritius increased its regional export share from 10%
to 22% of the total, Madagascar from 5% to 17%,
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Lesotho from 13% to 32%, and Eswatini from 39%
to 98%. This dynamic has not gone unnoticed.
Staritz (2011, p. 57) argues that following the 2008
financial crisis: ‘regional end markets, in particular
South Africa in the case of SSA, also may become
central to substitute for reduced exports to devel-
oped countries’ markets.’ More recently, Morris
et al. (2016, 1245) indicate that: ‘regionalizing
exports […] are important for Lesotho, Swaziland,
Madagascar and Mauritius, but not for Kenya.’ But
the extent of this regionalisation trend has been
underestimated, and the role of South African
retailers in conjunction with that of public
institutions, and specifically the interaction
between trade, investment and labour regimes,
has not been adequately investigated.
Import data confirms the centrality of South
Africa to regional apparel trade: the only country
whose regional apparel imports grew is South Africa
(Fig. 3). Whereas Staritz (2011) noted that regional
clothing imports by South Africa ‘remained rela-
tively marginal, reaching only 9%’, by 2018
regional sourcing constituted about 31.5% of South
Africa’s total apparel imports. Of this, 33.3% orig-
inated from Eswatini, 23.9% from Lesotho, 23.2%







































































Figure 3 SSA largest regional importers (trend) – thousand USD. Source UN-COMTRADE.
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Conversely, in the same year over 95% of regional
clothing imports by Namibia, Botswana and Zam-
bia originated from South Africa, mostly in the
form of re-exports.
Furthermore, South Africa’s apparel market gen-
erated the second highest revenue in SSA (Figure 4)
and was second in terms of per-capita expenditure
on apparel (after Mauritius), about five times larger
than the SSA average.
In what follows, we concentrate our analysis on
Eswatini and Lesotho, and their linkages with the
South African end market. Importantly, we are not
comparing between Lesotho and Eswatini and their
ties with South African retailers, but rather consid-
ering what factors help explain the emergence of
Lesotho and Eswatini collectively as the leading
exporters of apparel to the regional market.
DRIVERS OF APPAREL RVCS IN SOUTHERN
AFRICA: PRIVATE GOVERNANCE
Historically, South Africa’s apparel sector has been
dominated by six national retailers (Top-6), whose
sales in 2015 accounted for over 90% of the
nation’s total (Fig. 5).1 Their sourcing strategy up
to the early 2000’s, was largely restricted to a
number of large full-package local manufacturers
(Staritz, 2011). Over the last two decades, however,
two factors significantly reshaped the Top-6 regio-
nal sourcing and retailing strategies: (i) increasing
access to large volumes of cheaper garments made
in China and South Asia; and (ii) the more recent
entrance of global apparel retailers like Zara and
H&M into the South African market. These devel-
opments indicate an increasingly competitive
domestic market. We analyse these in turn.
Following South Africa’s democratic election of
1994 and its membership of the World Trade
Organization (WTO) in 1995, import tariffs and
quotas on a number of goods including textile and
apparel were significantly reduced (Staritz, 2011).
Throughout the late 1990s and early 2000s, this
scaled down the cost of garments sourced from
overseas, with the result that South African retailers
increased their share of global sourcing from Asia
sixfold between 2000 and 2005, with concomitant
reduced internal production (Fig. 6). In the process,
the Top-6 significantly improved their bargaining
power vis-à-vis local manufacturers, leading to a
fundamental restructuring of production (Staritz,
2011). The number of South African full-package
apparel manufacturers declined, the average size of
firms decreased, employment dropped by at about
30% from 2008,2 and a large proportion of apparel
production started shifting to neighbouring coun-
tries with lower production costs (Godfrey, 2013).
Our data suggest that between 2000 and 2018/19,
the number of South African-owned apparel pro-
duction plants in Eswatini and Lesotho rose from
zero to 9 in Eswatini and 18 in Lesotho, employing
about 19,000 workers (11,500 in Lesotho and 7500
in Eswatini).
From a retail perspective, South Africa’s internal
market has become more competitive following the
entrance and expansion of large international
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Figure 4 Total revenue generated by the apparel sector in SSA by country (2018) – million USD. Source Statista.
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H&M in 2015, and LC-Waikiki in 2018. At the same
time, the Top-6 have expanded their presence
outside South Africa. Between 2006 and 2018, their
number of outlets in SSA (excluding South Africa)
expanded by over 250%, with significant growth
for each retailer and stretching as far as Kenya,
Ghana and Nigeria (Table 1).
The link between the two trends noted above was
illustrated by the following quotes. The head of a
retail business association in South Africa stated:
‘Large international retailers are slowly coming in:
Zara, H&M, and Cotton On. It is a nuisance and it is
costing us [local retailers] money… As local retail-








2008 2010 2012 2014 2016 2018
Internal producon Global Imports Regional imports
Figure 6 South Africa’s apparel production and imports (2008-
2018) – thousand USD. Notes: South Africa did not report
imports from SACU before 2011. Data on South Africa’s internal
production not available after 2016. Source Authors’ compilation
combining data from UN-COMTRADE and Statistics South
Africa.
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Figure 5 South Africa’s apparel retail concentration (% share). Source Barnes and Hartogh (2019).
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Importing from places like Lesotho and Eswatini is
an easier and cheaper option…’ (Cape Town, 15/
04/2019), and the divisional executive of a Top-6
argued: ‘We are facing strong competition from
new retailers and cheaper imports. To be compet-
itive, we need to broaden our market base and look
at Africa not just for sourcing, but increasingly for
retailing…’ (Johannesburg, 05/07/2019). Another
retailer also stressed that, as international brands
enter the market, the pressure on cutting costs
increases: ‘carefully expanding our presence in
Africa and globally will allow us to increase scales
and revenue.’ (Johannesburg, 04 /07/2019)
Overall, from a private governance perspective,
RVCs emerged via a two-way process: first, the
regionalisation of production as suppliers sought to
retain orders with retail clients by reducing prices
through relocation to neighbouring Lesotho and
Eswatini and, second, the regionalisation of retail-
ing as the Top-6 gradually expanded their presence
and sales across the sub-continent. However, as we
shall see in the next sections, regional sourcing by
South African retailers goes well beyond the relo-
cation of South African suppliers, and it includes an
increasing number of global suppliers shifting from
GVCs to RVCs.
DRIVERS OF APPAREL RVCS IN SOUTHERN
AFRICA: PUBLIC GOVERNANCE
In this section, we examine how trade, investment
and labour regimes at national, regional and global
levels, have influenced the dynamics of apparel
RVCs in Southern Africa. These ‘regimes’ are pri-
marily a function of public policy, but firms and
trade unions also play an important role in shaping
them. The interaction of these ‘regimes’ creates a
framework of rules that critically enables and
incentivises private actors’ decision.
Trade Regimes
Southern African apparel value chains are strongly
influenced by global and regional trade regimes. At
the global level, AGOA has provided most countries
in SSA with preferential, duty- and quota-free access
to the lucrative US market since 2001.3 For most
SSA countries, these preferences come with single
transformation rules of origin, which allows them to
use fabrics imported from third countries in their
apparel exports to the US.4 AGOA further requires
member countries to fulfil a long list of compliance
regulations in order to be eligible – including the
enforcement of private property rights, the protec-
tion of worker rights through the ratification of ILO
core conventions, the protection of human rights,
the elimination of barriers to US investments, a
system to combat corruption, and economic poli-
cies to reduce poverty (AGOA, 2020).
Table 1 The Top-6 retail footprints in SSA
2005/06 2018/19




47 stores: Botswana (6), Namibia (37), Eswatini (4) 199 stores: Botswana (27), Eswatini (12), Ghana (5), Kenya
(4), Lesotho (12), Namibia (107), Zambia (32)
Mr Price 83 stores: Botswana (24), Eswatini (12), Ghana (1),
Kenya (2), Lesotho (2), Mozambique (1), Namibia (40),
Zambia (1)
114 stores: Botswana (24), Eswatini (11), Ghana (4), Kenya
(11), Lesotho (5), Namibia (41), Nigeria (5), Zambia (13)
Pepkor (Missing data) 422 stores: Angola (66), Botswana (38), Eswatini (24),
Lesotho (17), Malawi (15), Mozambique (58), Namibia
(76), Nigeria (51), Uganda (12), Zambia (65)
Truworths 12 stores: Eswatini (4), Namibia (8) 39 stores: Botswana (8), Eswatini (5), Kenya (2), Lesotho (2),
Mauritius (2), Namibia (18), Zambia (2)
Woolworths* 35 stores across SADC (24) and the rest of Africa (11) 64 stores across Botswana, Eswatini, Kenya, Lesotho,
Mozambique, Namibia, Mauritius, Tanzania, Uganda,
Zambia
Notes Since 2015, The Foschini Group, Pepkor and Woolworths have expanded beyond SSA; *Including grocery stores.
Source Authors’ compilation based on retailers’ annual reports and interviews.
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While the Multi-Fibre Arrangement encouraged
the emergence of apparel GVCs in the early 1990s
and AGOA provided the incentive to maintain
them later on, regional trade agreements have
played a critical role in the dynamics of RVCs.
SACU is a long-established customs union with free
trade between Lesotho, Eswatini, Botswana, Namib-
ia, and South Africa (with no specified rules of
origin). Furthermore, the SADC Trade Protocol of
2008 allows duty- and quota-free trade of apparel
under ‘double transformation’ rules of origin,
requiring fabrics to originate from within SADC
(Staritz, 2011, 95). Unlike AGOA, SACU and SADC
do not impose any other major conditionalities.
The critical role of global and regional trade
agreements in shaping firms’ participation in RVCs
is illustrated by the case of Eswatini. Starting as
early as 2003, the country faced increasing criticism
for failing to comply with AGOA’s requirements on
workers’ freedom of assembly, including the free
functioning of trade unions. Eventually, this led to
it losing its AGOA status from 2015 (The Econo-
mist, 2014). With a rapid and sharp drop in US
orders, all transnational suppliers in Eswatini had
shifted their end market to South Africa by 2017.
This contradicts Morris et al.’s (2016, 1259) finding
on the ‘disembeddedness’ of ‘transnational produc-
ers focused on the US market’. Instead, managers of
well-established Taiwanese suppliers, part of trian-
gular manufacturing networks serving the US mar-
ket, exerted a degree of autonomy to develop a
regional strategy. The manager of a large plant in
Eswatini stated: ‘At the beginning, my boss in
Taiwan was not interested in exporting to South
Africa. We tried to relocate to Lesotho, but it did
not work […] Now, finally, they are sending more
managers from Taiwan to help me cope with the
new structure… In the long run, even if we go back
to the US market, we want to continue exporting to
South Africa… We cannot rely only on one market.’
(Matsapha, 19/07/19)
As noted above, it was the South African buyers
that took the initiative to tap into the capacity of
Eswatini’s large transnational exporters. Of seven
Eswatini firms actively exporting to the US in 2011,
four were directly contacted by regional buyers:
‘We didn’t approach the South African side because
we are not familiar, but somehow they came to us,
and asked us to do woven, which we could. We
started with small orders… They helped us a lot…’
(Nhlangano, 12/07/2019). A South African buyer
stated: ‘We knew their market was gone… There are
not many factories of that size and capability in
South Africa… It was an opportunity. They’ve got a
large contingent of mechanics and supervisors from
outside the country. You know, they can go to
Taiwan and interview people, I can’t, I don’t have
that skill…’ (Matsanjeni, 22/07/2019)
The situation in Lesotho is different. The country
was never threatened by exclusion from AGOA.
Consequently, shifting of foreign-owned transna-
tional suppliers from the US to the South African
market was limited compared to Eswatini. Yet, it
did occur. In early 2017, out of a total of 28
Taiwanese and Chinese-owned factories employing
31,943 workers, six firms had switched entirely to
supplying South Africa (total employment 4369
workers), and another two firms were supplying
both the US and South Africa (total employment
1032 workers).5
Whilst most Southern Africa apparel producers
can access both global and regional markets duty-
and quota-free, differential tariffs for other global
exporters critically shape the value chain. In the
absence of a trade preference arrangement, coun-
tries import under nationally set ‘most favoured
nations’ (MFN) tariffs. This is especially significant
for the South African market, but also for the US
Table 2 Tariffs for major apparel exporters to the US and SACU
Exporting country Destination
US SACU
China 0–32% (MFN) 40–45% (MFN)
Bangladesh 0–32% (MFN) 40–45% (MFN)
Viet-Nam 0–32% (MFN) 40–45% (MFN)
India 0–32% (MFN) 40–45% (MFN)
CAFTA countries 0% (CAFTA) 40–45% (MFN)
Kenya and Ethiopia 0% (AGOA) 40–45% (MFN)
SACU and SADC countries 0% (AGOA) 0%*
Notes *double-transformation for SADC (non-SACU).
Source authors’ compilation based on ITC data
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where Chinese-made apparel, which often com-
petes with SSA apparel exports, faces MFN tariffs. In
2018, China, Bangladesh, Viet Nam and CAFTA
region6 were among the largest apparel exporters
into the US. In the same year, China, Bangladesh,
and India were the main non-SADC apparel
exporters to South Africa. Table 2 summarises the
tariffs these countries face to access the US and
SACU markets and further compares them with the
tariffs faced by SSA apparel exporters.
All but AGOA and CAFTA countries face up to
32% MFN tariffs when entering the US market.
However, for the products that SACU countries
export most to the US (i.e. men’s trousers, women’s
trousers, and men’s shirts) MFN tariffs range
between 0% and 14.9%. Therefore, SADC and
SACU countries’ advantage over their global com-
petitors ranges from 0% to 14.9% for the US
market. This is considerably lower than the advan-
tage they enjoy when exporting to South Africa,
where all major non-SACU/SADC competitors face
a 40–45% MFN tariff.
To get a better sense of how tariff regimes affect
sourcing, we compare unit values for the top two
products exported by Lesotho, Eswatini, Madagas-
car and Mauritius that are common to the US and
South African markets. With the exception of
Mauritius, unit values are consistently higher for
the same products when exported to South Africa
than to the US (Fig. 7). On the one hand, the
relatively higher unit values characterising regional
exports reflect a demand for short-run products
with a higher fashion content. Here, it is argued,
regional production networks allow for more flex-
ibility and increasing speed-to-market via a rapid
turnaround (Morris et al., 2011, 2016). On the
other hand, the outcome of Fig. 7 is in line with the
statements provided by suppliers, which suggests
that the South African market is less price compet-
itive. The manager of an Eswatini factory
explained:
‘To do business with the US, you need to be a
huge company. When they place the order, they
tell you ‘‘this is Bangladesh and Cambodia’s price.
What price can you give to me?’’ If Bangladesh or
Ethiopia charges USD 4, we have not only to do to
the same, but they say we need to do it at USD 3.5
because we have the duty advantage… The US
market is all about big volumes and low prices.
South Africa instead [demands] smaller volumes
but pays better prices.’ (Nhlangano, 13/09/2019)
Whilst Eswatini was officially reinstated into
AGOA in 2018, as of December 2019 no firm had
shifted back to the US market. Crucially, when
asked why they are not reverting to the US market
following reinstatement, five firms previously











































Figure 7 Unit values for the top three exported products to the
US and South Africa for Eswatini, Lesotho, Madagascar and
Mauritius (2017). Notes: data for 2017 is the most up-to-date
across countries. Since Eswatini was excluded from AGOA in
2015, $/ton for Eswatini is based on 2014 data. 6-digit products’
Harmonised System Codes in parenthesis. Source UN-
COMTRADE.
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‘competition and lower profit margins’ as major
factors (Fig. 8). The other main factor was the
complex bureaucracy and auditing required to fulfil
AGOA requirements. The managing director of a
large Taiwanese firm, indicating tension between
his own regional preference and his head office,
stated:
‘I’m not very interested in going back to the US, but I get
pressure from my main office in Taiwan. The problem is the
price… US buyers are looking for an AGOA country to supply
their product, but they’re still asking us to compete with the
Bangladesh on price, but it’s not fair! My main office still has
to consider this… Maybe we will do some business with US
buyers, if we select the better price customers only…’
(Matsapha, 11/07/2019).
The manager of another factory in Eswatini was
also sceptical of a potential return to AGOA,
especially on stricter conditionalities: ‘You need
to have documentation for everything. They [US
buyers] have more requirements than the South
Africans. They want the company to be like a 5-star
hotel… They need to check everything, doors,
waste, workers… With South Africa we just follow
the local laws…’ (Nhlangano, 17/07/2019)
Investment Regimes
As discussed in section four, the number of South
African-owned apparel production plants in Eswa-
tini and Lesotho rose significantly over the last two
decades. Along with trade preferences, a critical
motivation for South African FDIs was attractive
investment packages. In both Lesotho and
Eswatini, investment regimes have had three main
pillars: (i) establishing investment promotion agen-
cies (i.e. the Lesotho National Development Cor-
poration (LNDC) and the Eswatini Investment
Promotion Agency (EIPA)) to reduce times and
costs of setting up factories in the country; (ii)
developing a package of tax incentives available to
foreign investors; and (iii) granting access to indus-
trial infrastructure, e.g. factory ‘shells’ in industrial
parks with subsidised rentals.
LNDC and EIPA were set up in 1967 and 1988,
respectively, to promote foreign investments. Their
scope has been to help investors fast-track compli-
ance with tax and labour laws, provide information
on standards and trade compliance across export
markets, and manage the provision of factory
shells. For instance, as of 2019, LNDC and EIPA
were allocating ten shells per year over the next
4 years in Eswatini and 11 shells at a new site in
Lesotho (Dlamini, 2019).
Tax incentives have also been a major plank in
the strategy to attract FDIs. In Lesotho, since 2004,
foreign investors benefit from a reduced 10%
corporate income tax, no withholding tax on
dividends, and tax-free repatriation of profits. In
the early 2000s, Eswatini introduced a special tax
dispensation for exporters under AGOA: an income
tax on profits of only 10% (compared to the normal
rate of 27.5%), and a 15% withholding tax on
dividends paid to foreign shareholders. In addition,
since 2007, both countries enjoy a SACU provision
for duty- and VAT-free access to capital equipment
and the possibility for firms to operate through
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Figure 8 Reasons cited for
not reverting to the US
market by Eswatini garment
exporters (2019). Source
authors’ survey.
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discount VAT and import duties on fabrics
imported from outside SACU. Lesotho and Eswatini
introduced double taxation agreements with South
Africa in 1997 and 2004, respectively, exempting
South African investors from paying taxes in South
Africa for income generated in the two SACU
countries.
In Eswatini, EIPA crucially facilitated links with
South African buyers for three transnational pro-
ducers and helped them shift to the South Africa
market when suspension from AGOA loomed. The
facilitation included the extension of fiscal benefits
previously restricted to overseas exporters. Since
then, all large firms previously exporting to the US
have renegotiated their preferential treatment to
cover their South Africa exports. The manager of a
large Taiwanese-owned plant explained:
‘I asked the government to allow me to shift to the local
market. I had to ask, because when we came, we had
preferential fiscal treatment granted because of AGOA. I
asked, why don’t you allow me to do SACU production, I can
get better prices and workers can get better salaries? So,
eventually they agreed. Other factories followed me […] I’m
the leader of this idea’. (Nhlangano, 13/09/19)
The majority of South African investors in Eswa-
tini also report benefitting from the local govern-
ment’s investment dispensation, particularly the
lower corporate tax rate, but this is secondary to the
attraction of low labour costs. Furthermore, as
argued by an official at EIPA, there is no need to
assist South African investors with trade because
they know the market, but ‘lower taxes in a system
that allows duty-free exports’ are an attraction
(Mbabane, 08/07/2019). The manager of the first
South African plant to relocate to Eswatini also
explained: ‘It is very easy to start a business in
[Eswatini]… This happens via EIPA. EIPA has
improved… It is now a more welcoming and
helpful environment’ (Johannesburg, 04/07/2019).
Labour Regimes
Regional trade regimes and investment regimes
facilitated the growth of apparel RVCs between
South Africa and Lesotho and Eswatini. Yet, sharp
differences between the labour regimes in these
countries critically contributed to this process.
While minimum standards regulation can be
quantified and relatively easily compared, labour
regimes are more complex and are for the most part
the result of enabling provisions. The system that
emerges is therefore determined largely by how
trade unions and employers use the national
legislation. This caveat aside, there is no doubt
that South Africa has a much more developed
labour regime than those in Lesotho and Eswatini.
In South Africa almost all workers are covered by
labour legislation, there is a national minimum
wage, legislated minimum conditions of employ-
ment and some sectoral minimum wages and
conditions, freedom of association and organisa-
tional rights, a well-established centralised collec-
tive bargaining system, protection against unfair
dismissal, effective dispute resolution institutions,
a health and safety statute, workmen’s compensa-
tion and unemployment insurance, and an exten-
sive (but poorly functioning) training system. The
labour regimes in Lesotho and Eswatini share only
some of these features and do not match the levels
at which standards are set and rights protected in
South Africa.
In the apparel sector, it is collective bargaining
that sets South Africa apart from Lesotho and
Eswatini. Legislation in South Africa includes a
framework for the voluntary establishment of sec-
toral bargaining structures called bargaining councils
and provides a mechanism through which collec-
tive agreements reached in the bargaining councils
are extended to apply to all employers and employ-
ees in the sector. Agreements reached at the
National Bargaining Council for the Clothing
Industry (NBCCI) currently regulate minimum
wages, conditions of employment, and social ben-
efit funds for all workers in the apparel sector.
Lesotho does not have equivalent collective
bargaining provisions. Its legislation protects free-
dom of association but provides no support for
organisation by trade unions or a framework for
collective bargaining at either firm or sectoral levels
(Godfrey, 2013; 2015). Eswatini, on the other hand,
has a framework for the establishment of joint
negotiation councils which is similar to that of
South Africa, including a mechanism to extend
agreements. However, trade unions in Eswatini
have not yet managed to establish such a council
for the apparel sector, effectively rendering these
provisions irrelevant at this point in time.
The differences between the labour regimes
become sharper when one shifts the focus from the
‘enabling provisions’ to the way in which the
apparel trade union in South Africa has used NBCCI
to improve sectoral wages and working conditions.
The Southern African Clothing and Textile Workers
Union (SACTWU), was formed in 1989 out of a
series of amalgamations of textile and clothing
unions, in a period when progressive trade unions
Regional value chains in Southern Africa Giovanni Pasquali et al.
381
Journal of International Business Policy
burgeoned in South Africa. The amalgamations left
SACTWU well positioned: it was the only trade
union in the apparel sector and it had a very high
level of representation amongst workers (Maree &
Godfrey, 1995, 131–133). From its inception it
sought to increase historically low wages and to
merge the regional industrial councils into a
national council. This was achieved in 2002 with
the creation of the NBCCI. In the years that
followed, the labour cost differentials narrowed
between the major clothing manufacturing centres
in South Africa as well as between these centres and
rural areas (Godfrey, 2013).
Bargaining by SACTWU to raise wages, while
tariffs came down and local manufacturers rapidly
lost market share to cheap imports, saw the sector
shrink and restructure. The solution for some
manufacturers was to relocate to neighbouring
countries that had weaker trade unions, limited or
no collective bargaining, and much lower labour
costs. One such firm explained the rationale to
relocate to Lesotho as follows:
‘The main emphasis of why we started in Lesotho was purely
from a cost point of view, because the labour rates are much
cheaper in Lesotho than in South Africa. The second thing is
you can work a full 45-h week here. And the third issue is
you are not so hamstrung with the unions and all these
fancy regulations that they have in South Africa. Those are
the three main criteria.’ (Maputsoe, 29/06/2011)
The South African owner of another firm in
Lesotho stated:




Upon joining the WTO in 1995, South
Africa agreed to significantly phase
down import tariffs, eventually
settling for a 40% tariff for apparel
SACU allows South African retailers to
source from Lesotho and Eswatini
duty-free, while from 2008 SADC
further enables them to source from
Madagascar and Mauritius under
‘double transformation’ rules of origin
SACU set apparel tariff at 45%, which
makes regional duty-free imports
more competitive vis-à-vis imports
from outside SACU
The Multi-Fibre Agreement
encouraged the emergence of apparel
GVCs in Lesotho and Eswatini, and
AGOA provided the incentive to
maintain them after 2001. The
exclusion of Eswatini from AGOA in
2015 (and the process leading to it)




Lesotho and Eswatini’s national
legislation facilitating the inflow of
FDIs. This includes: export promotion
agencies (EIPA in Eswatini and LNDC
in Lesotho) providing access to factory
shells and legal support; discounted
corporate income tax and
withholding tax on dividends paid to
foreign shareholders
Double-taxation agreements between
Lesotho / Eswatini and South Africa,
and SACU provision for duty- and
VAT-free access to capital equipment
General provision under AGOA for the




In South Africa, progressive labour
legislation after 1994 provides
comprehensive coverage of workers.
Through the National Bargaining
Council, a strong trade union centrally
negotiates wages and working
conditions that extend across the
sector. Lower union density in
Eswatini and fragmented unions in
Lesotho, with collective bargaining
limited in both countries, makes them
attractive manufacturing options for
South African firms
No regional harmonisation of labour
policy, pitting wage levels and labour
standards in South Africa directly
against those in Lesotho and Eswatini
South African retailers are generally
not concerned with labour
standards at suppliers in Lesotho and
Eswatini. Only one joined a social
compliance organisation (i.e. the
Ethical Trading Initiative). In
Lesotho, almost all regional suppliers
refused to join the ILO Better Work
Programme
Lesotho and Eswatini must comply
with AGOA labour requirements
(including the ratification of ILO core
conventions) – failure to do so
resulted in Eswatini suspension
(2015–2018) and provided a catalyst
for suppliers to shift to RVCs
Suppliers exporting to the US under
AGOA are subject to comparatively
more rigorous codes of conduct and
are audited regularly. As Eswatini
regained AGOA membership in
2018, this has been one of the main
deterrents for suppliers to revert to
the US market
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‘At the end of the day if you’re trying to sell this product for
R100 and your wage cost is R35 you are on a hiding to
nothing [referring to South Africa]. You have to have
Swaziland and Lesotho… And it is purely because you can
come here [Lesotho] and compete globally… And all you do
[in South Africa] is get hounded by the bargaining council
the whole time, who are the ‘‘Gestapo’’ for the unions…’
(Maseru, 06/12/2018)
Our fieldwork in Eswatini found that six of the
seven (still active) suppliers that initially relocated
from South Africa identified ‘union pressures and
higher wages’ as the primary motive for relocating
(Fig. 9). Other reasons for moving include: Eswa-
tini’s attractive investment policy (4), AGOA single
transformation rules of origin (3), better security
(2), and direct support from the government (2). As
the manager of a South African production unit
that moved to Eswatini explained: ‘The main
reason why we left [South Africa] is because of the
bargaining council and the union… They were
hammering us and we just couldn’t run our busi-
ness. Eswatini offered a competitive edge into
South Africa…’ (Matsapha, 24/07/2019)
Wages are the major component of labour costs.
While sector-wide wage rates are negotiated annu-
ally at the NBCCI, unions in Eswatini and Lesotho
are less well organised and collective bargaining is
limited. In Lesotho, there are five rival trade unions
in the apparel sector, none of which is well
organised. In the absence of wage bargaining at
the firm level, unions engage in annual multipar-
tite consultations facilitated by the Wages Advisory
Board, which then recommends an increase for the
sector. The situation is better in Eswatini: the major
trade union in the sector, the Amalgamated Trade
Union of Swaziland (ATUSWA), is recognised as the
representative of their workforce by five of the 21
apparel manufacturers, but as at 2019 only two had
concluded a collective agreement with it. ATUSWA,
furthermore, does not have sufficient representa-
tion in the sector to push for the establishment of a
joint negotiation council. In its absence a mini-
mum wage is periodically set by a Wages Council
together with the Ministry of Labour and Social
Security.
Apparel employers in Eswatini are however less
accommodating than those in Lesotho: by informal
agreement firms pay exactly at the prescribed
minimum wage and have made a concerted
attempt to avoid collective bargaining with
ATUSWA. The spokesperson for the Eswatini Tex-
tile and Apparel Traders Association (ETATA) stated
it ‘will deal only with trade-related issues. [It] will
not engage in collective bargaining with unions or
in negotiations over labour regulations’ (Matsapha,
11/07/2019). Our interviews also revealed consid-
erable dissatisfaction with one employer who had
allegedly ‘broken ranks’ to negotiate higher wages
with the union.
In light of the above, the steep regional wage
differentials, which motivated South African man-
ufacturers to relocate, remain, and with their close
proximity make Lesotho and Eswatini attractive
sourcing options for South African retailers. In
August 2019, the weekly minimum wage of a
trainee and a qualified machinist in South Africa
ranged between ZAR 806-857 and ZAR 909-1164,
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Figure 9 Reasons cited for
moving from South Africa to
Eswatini (2019). Notes: Data
is reported for firms that were
previously operating in South
Africa (independent of their
ownership). Firms can
provide more than one
answer. Source authors’
survey.
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than half, ranging from ZAR 284 to ZAR 391 for the
former and from ZAR 418 to ZAR 492 for the latter
(Fig. 10). If one were to add social security contri-
butions to the minimum wages, the gap is even
wider.
Differences with regard to private governance
provide a further factor favouring regional supply.
While exporters to the US must comply with US
retailers’ codes of conduct, the same is not true
within RVCs (Godfrey et al., 2019). These codes and
the auditing that accompanies them is one of the
reasons suppliers in Eswatini do not want to revert
to the US market. Conversely, with few exceptions,
such codes do not exist or are comparatively less
demanding in RVCs. As reported by a factory
manager in Eswatini: ‘US audits were nonsense.
They ask us to observe human rights, stop bag
searching, reduce overtime… If you export to the
US market you have to comply. […] South African
buyers are more understanding. They don’t touch
these issues because they know what’s going on.
They are not worried with this as long as you
deliver.’ (Nhlangano, 17/07/19)
Not much has therefore changed since Staritz’s
(2011, p.188) survey found that ‘only two [South
African] retailers stated that labour compliance is
important in their sourcing criteria’. To date, only
one of the Top-6 has committed to ethical sourcing
by joining the UK-based Ethical Trading Initiative
(ETI), thereby binding suppliers to ETI’s base code.
The other five retailers vary from making only
vague statements of intent in their annual reports
to taking tentative in-house steps towards greater
scrutiny of labour conditions at suppliers. Further,
the practice of sourcing via intermediary agencies –
known as design houses – allows South African
retailers to screen themselves from association with
labour conditions at supplier factories (in 2019, 12
out of 21 plants in Eswatini were contracted via
design houses) (Pasquali & Godfrey, 2020). The low
concern for labour standards among South African
lead firms is further evident in Lesotho, where in
2010 the ILO launched the Better Work Programme
to enforce compliance in country’s apparel indus-
try. Yet, while most suppliers to the US, under
pressure from their buyers, joined the programme,
South African retailers would not endorse the
programme with the result that almost all South
Africa-oriented suppliers refused to join it (Godfrey
et. al., 2019).
CONCLUSION
The growth of South–South trade and the increas-
ing importance of RVCs is now widely recognised.
What is less well understood is what factors deter-
mine the dynamics of RVCs. Traditional interna-
tional business and economic geography
scholarships have historically focused on the cen-
trality of lead firms who exercise private gover-
nance to shape global and regional value chain
linkages. More recent arguments have underlined
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Figure 10 Weekly minimum wages for trainee and qualified
sewing machinists in 2019 (ZAR). Notes: In South Africa
minimum wages for sewing machinists vary between
metropolitan areas (e.g. in Western Cape and KwaZulu-Natal),
and between these areas and non-metropolitan areas. Within
these areas there are further sub-divisions captured by the
columns’ bracketed bars. Source authors’ data.
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public governance, through various forms of local,
national, regional and global policy interventions.
Building on this agenda, our focus has been to
understand how particular forms of RVC dynamics
observed in the Southern African apparel sector
have unfolded. While Sub-Saharan Africa is poorly
integrated in terms of intra-regional trade, the
apparel sector is an exception. Growth in intrare-
gional trade in apparel in SSA is marked, most
pointedly between South Africa, Lesotho and Eswa-
tini. We have sought to explain this development
by unpacking interactions between private and
public governance. In particular, we focused on
how firms’ behaviour was affected by trade, invest-
ment and labour regimes, which were themselves
framed by distinct global, regional and national
policies and institutional settings.
The growth of apparel RVCs in Southern Africa
was clearly driven by the agency of major South
African retailers who expanded their sourcing and
retailing presence regionally. Their actions were
critically influenced by trade, investment and
labour regimes – as summarised in Table 3. Whilst
the Multi-Fibre Arrangement and AGOA created
important opportunities for SSA countries to access
the US market duty- and quota-free, the level of
protection within SACU implies that the South
African market is better screened from foreign
competition than its global alternatives. This facil-
itates regional sourcing. As argued in previous
studies, a number of suppliers with regional link-
ages have successfully leveraged this trade advan-
tage and engaged in RVCs (Morris et al., 2016;
Staritz & Morris, 2012; 2017). However, the active
pursuit of regional suppliers by South African
retailers and the loss of AGOA membership by
Eswatini saw increasing shifting towards RVCs also
of those ‘transnational producers focused on the US
market’ (Morris et al. 2016, 1259).
Investment incentives in Lesotho and Eswatini
further facilitated relocation by South African
apparel manufacturers and, in the latter case, the
shifting of transnational overseas exporters from
GVCs to RVCs. In addition, a strong trade union in
South Africa, sector-wide collective bargaining, and
much higher labour costs were a major catalyst that
propelled the foundation for RVCs. The role of
differential labour regimes in this regional dynamic
unfolded over time, running parallel with declining
tariff protection in South Africa. In this context,
SACU’s long-standing duty- and quota-free trade
regime encouraged relocation and regional
sourcing.
On the one hand, the centrality of South African
retailers and suppliers supports the notion that
heterogeneity in firm- and country-specific advantages
(i.e. labour costs) favours regional integration
through RVCs (Suder et al., 2015; Staritz, 2011).
Moreover, territorial proximity and ownership
characteristics, including the embeddedness of sup-
pliers in local and regional networks, have also
facilitated the formation of inter-firm regional
networks, especially via South African retailers
and manufacturers (Morris et al., 2016; Staritz and
Morris 2017). On the other hand, lead firms’
geographies of sourcing and retailing are crucially
shaped by public governance. This includes inter-
national and regional trade regimes along with
their rules of origin and tariff barriers (Curran et al.,
2019; Staritz, 2011), as well as national investment
policies and labour regimes (Godfrey, 2015). In
Eswatini, and to a lesser extent Lesotho, we also
observe a spillover from GVCs (Krishnan, 2018), as
transnational investments originally serving US
buyers shifted to RVCs following changes in global
trade regimes and national investment policies.
There are however few similarities cutting across
GVCs and RVCs. Private governance through audits
and codes of conduct is not as pervasive in RVCs as
it is in GVCs, a point reinforced by both transna-
tional suppliers in Eswatini who recently shifted to
the South African market, and by South African -
lead retailers.
Our findings add to calls for bringing new
perspectives to traditional GVC (and emergent
RVC) analysis. The traditional notions of gover-
nance in value chains need to be further concep-
tualised. Public governance clearly influences firms’
private governance. Moreover, we argue that not
only is this context specific, but that distinct forms
of policy, framed by different levels of geography
(national, regional and global), intersect. It is the
interweaving of these that drives specific lead firm
practices and results in particular forms of value
chain linkages, be they global, regional, or
national. We therefore concur with other economic
geography and international business scholars in
calling for a better understanding of the role of
public policy in the study of value chains (Gereffi &
Lee, 2016; Mayer & Phillips, 2017; Staritz & Whit-
field, 2017; Van Assche, 2017). Further, our study
shows that this interaction is not necessarily com-
plementary and thus ‘synergistic’, therefore leading
to firms’ upgrading, as Gereffi & Lee (2016) argue.
The interaction can be mutually supporting or
Regional value chains in Southern Africa Giovanni Pasquali et al.
385
Journal of International Business Policy
contradictory, leading to contingent outcomes and
value chain architecture.
The promotion of RVCs is attracting greater
attention by the policy community and especially
so in Sub-Saharan Africa (World Bank, 2019, 234;
De Melo & Twum, 2020). Our findings lend weight
to these discussions. It is clear that for RVCs to be
viable there has to be a commercially viable and
growing end market. South Africa’s relatively afflu-
ent middle-class consumer base provides that, and
the presence of well-organised South African retail-
ers has helped developing the necessary supply
chains, distribution systems and retail platforms for
RVCs in clothing to emerge. However, for these to
grow, regional trade preferences were a key
enabling factor. Yet, as we showed, trade regimes
are only part of the policy framework that facili-
tated the growth of RVCs. Investment policies and
labour regimes also matter. Public policy actors
need to consider more carefully the nature of the
interactions between these distinct policy levers in
promoting RVCs linkages. Hence, understanding
the ways in which trade, investment and labour
regimes are interwoven is critical to the policy
agenda. Together, these policy frameworks underlie
the need for more carefully considered regional,
and in some cases sector specific, industrial policy
strategies.
As RVCs grow, there also needs to be a closer
interrogation of how labour governance is brought
into regional trade preferences. As we show, the rise
of apparel RVCs in Southern Africa is also linked to
the fact that neither SACU nor SADC integrate
minimum labour standards in the respective trade
agreements. This is in sharp contrast to the ways in
which core labour standards are incorporated into
the trade preferences for the US (AGOA) and EU
(EBA) markets. Here, compliance with labour pro-
visions is a prerequisite, and failure to do so risks
exclusion from the agreements, as it was the case
for Eswatini in 2015. Our evidence indicates that
comparative labour regimes, marked by weak and
poorly enforced labour legislation and weaker trade
unions in Eswatini and Lesotho, ensure signifi-
cantly lower wages and thus a potential ‘race to the
bottom’ in terms of sourcing practices by lead
retailers. This finding is particularly important for
the African continent at a time when it is on the
brink of implementing the African Continental
Free Trade Area (AfCFTA). To date, AfCFTA has
given no consideration to differential labour stan-
dards across the continent, and there is no social
clause in the agreement. Whilst its implementation
will likely benefit South African apparel retailers as
they can source from Ethiopia where labour costs
are amongst the lowest in the world (Whitfield
et al., 2020), it will also put enormous pressure on
labour market institutions as well as employment,
not only in South Africa but in Eswatini and
Lesotho as well.
To avoid this outcome, there is an urgent need to
consider how labour provisions can be integrated
within the AfCFTA protocols, thus allowing public
governance to shape the architecture of existing
and future regional value chains in a way that will
promote more equitable forms of regional integra-
tion. This will be a significant policy challenge
given the nature of uneven development in the
African continent and it is one that policymakers
appear to have baulked at to date.
ACKNOWLEDGMENTS
We would like to thank the ESRC-GCRF for the ES/
S000453/1 grant to which this paper is linked as part
of the project ‘Shifting South: decent work in regional
value chains and South–South trade’. We are also
extremely grateful to the three anonymous referees
and the editors for the insightful comments which
have significantly improved the paper. Finally, the
completion of this work has benefitted from the useful
comments of our colleagues of the GPN Research
Group at the University of Manchester and the
participants at the SASE 2020 (Network O) where an
earlier version of this paper was presented.
NOTES
1Figure 5 presents the outcome of five of the Top-
6 retailers, as no data is available for the largest
retailer Pepkor. Including it would raise the total
market share by about 20–25% to over 90% (Barnes
& Hartogh, 2019).
2Employment data retrieved from South Africa
Department of Trade and Industry (Barnes & Har-
togh, 2019).
3Analogous provisions extend duty-free access to
the EU market under the Everything-But-Arms
regime for least developed countries and the Eco-
nomic Partnership Agreements for SADC countries.
However, we focus here on AGOA, since Lesotho
and Eswatini’s exports to the EU are negligible.
4Under AGOA, only South Africa does not qualify
for single transformation. Its apparel exports
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require ‘triple transformation’ – including spin-
ning, weaving/knitting, and clothing production
(Staritz 2011, 60).
5Authors’ calculations based on interviews and
previous research by Bennett (2017).
6CAFTA refers to The Dominican Republic-Cen-
tral America Free Trade Agreement, which grants
duty-free access to the US market to a number of
regional apparel exporters including Honduras, El
Salvador, and Nicaragua.
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